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Wind Energy, Benefit-Sharing and Indigenous Peoples: Lessons 
from the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, Southern Mexico 
Paola Velasco Herrejon* and Annalisa Savaresi** 
Abstract 
This article looks at the practice of benefit-sharing in wind energy projects in indigenous 
peoples’ lands in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, Mexico. The aim is to gauge how the 
procedural, distributive and recognition justice associated with the development of 
renewable energy generation capacity have been addressed, the challenges experienced and 
the solutions that may be adopted to address these. The paper is organised as follows. After 
an introduction setting out the research questions, context and background of the paper, part 
two unpacks the justice questions associated with benefit-sharing in the context of renewable 
energy generation. Part three looks at how these questions have been addressed in practice, 
in the context of renewable energy projects in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec. Part four reflects 
on what our case study has revealed about the use of benefit-sharing as a means to engender 
energy justice.  
1. Introduction 
The concept of benefit-sharing is closely linked with that of social license to operate (SLO)1 
discussed in this special issue. Benefit-sharing often is a pre-requisite to obtain an SLO and 
increase the social acceptance of projects. Indeed, benefit-sharing arrangements are 
widespread practice in various natural resource management and extractive activities, both to 
mitigate the negative impacts of, and reduce opposition to, projects and increase their social 
acceptance.2 The contours of developers’ obligations in the energy sector are context specific 
and depend on the applicable legal frameworks, as well as on industry practices. 
Communities living in the vicinity of a project typically receive various economic and non-
economic advantages from developers, including for example monetary payments per 
capacity installed, as well as electricity at discounted prices or the development of common 
facilities for recreation.3 
 
* PhD Candidate, University of Cambridge: pv296@cam.ac.uk. The author is grateful to CONACYT for 
funding this research (CVU No. 469917). 
** Lecturer in Environmental Law, University of Stirling: annalisa.savaresi@stir.ac.uk  Dr Savaresi gratefully 
acknowledges the support received for the preparation of this paper from the project “BENELEX: Benefit-
sharing for an equitable transition to the green economy - the role of law” 
(https://www.strath.ac.uk/research/strathclydecentreenvironmentallawgovernance/benelex/) Grant number 
335592, funded by the European Research Council Starting Grant. 
1 N. Hall and others, ‘Social Licence to Operate: Understanding How a Concept Has Been Translated into 
Practice in Energy Industries’ (2015) 86 Journal of Cleaner Production 301. 
2 See Elisa Morgera, ‘The Need for an International Legal Concept of Fair and Equitable Benefit Sharing’ 
(2016) 27 European Journal of International Law 353. 
3 As explained e.g. in LeRoy C Paddock and Max Greenblum, ‘Community Benefit Agreements for Wind Farm 
Siting in Context’ in Lila Barrera-Hernandez and others (eds), Sharing the Costs and Benefits of Energy and 
Resource Activity: Legal Change and Impact on Communities (Oxford University Press 2016) 180; Anita 
Rønne, ‘Opposition to Wind Farms and Possible Responses of the Legal System’ in Lila Barrera-Hernandez and 
others (eds), Sharing the Costs and Benefits of Energy and Resource Activity: Legal Change and Impact on 
Communities (Oxford University Press 2016). 
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This paper specifically looks at the practice of benefit-sharing in wind energy projects in 
indigenous peoples’ lands. The creation of wind energy projects in remote and rural 
communities is commonly regarded as a win-win strategy to ‘ensure access to affordable, 
reliable, sustainable, and modern energy for all’4, while at the same time creating 
development opportunities for often marginalised and impoverished groups. Indeed, in recent 
years rural and local communities around the world have ‘unwittingly’ become ‘protagonists 
of the energy transition’.5  
As with any other change of the status quo, however, the quest for the tools to move away 
from fossil fuels based energy systems raises questions on the ways in which change is 
enacted, and the associated justice implications.6 In other words, while reliance on fossil-fuel 
based energy generation and the related governance arrangements undoubtedly created 
winners and losers, changing the status quo entails finding new equilibria,7 engendering 
change at the pace and scale needed.8 The profound social, economic and environmental 
impacts of renewable energy projects therefore have raised again familiar questions about 
governance and decision-making in capitalist societies9. Much scholarship in recent years has 
considered how to address the procedural,10 distributive11 and recognition12 justice questions 
associated with the expansion of renewable energy generation capacity. Little of this 
literature, however, has specifically considered these questions in the context of developing 
countries and of indigenous peoples’ lands. There is, in other words, a gap in the literature 
 
4 Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, UN Doc A/RES/70/1 (25 
September 2015) 54. 
5 Annalisa Savaresi, ‘The Rise of Community Energy from Grassroots to Mainstream: The Role of Law and 
Policy’ [2019] Journal of Environmental Law. 
6 See e.g. B. Sovacool, Energy and Ethics: Justice and the Global Energy Challenge (Palgrave Macmillan UK 
2013); Benjamin K Sovacool and others, ‘Energy Decisions Reframed as Justice and Ethical Concerns’ (2016) 1 
Nature Energy 16024; Kirsten Jenkins and others, ‘Energy Justice: A Conceptual Review’ (2016) 11 Energy 
Research & Social Science 174. 
7 See Ioan Fazey and others, ‘Transformation in a Changing Climate: A Research Agenda’ (2017) 9 Climate and 
Development 1, 10. 
8 See Laurence L. Delina and Benjamin K. Sovacool, ‘Of Temporality and Plurality: An Epistemic and 
Governance Agenda for Accelerating Just Transitions for Energy Access and Sustainable Development’ (2018) 
34 Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 1. 
9 D. Shearman and J.W. Smith, The Climate Change Challenge and the Failure of Democracy (Praeger, 2007) 
10 See e.g. Maria Lee and others, ‘Public Participation and Climate Change Infrastructure’ (2013) 25 Journal of 
Environmental Law 33; Marjan Peeters and Sandra Nóbrega, ‘Climate Change-Related Aarhus Conflicts: How 
Successful Are Procedural Rights in EU Climate Law?’ (2014) 23 RECIEL 354; Chiara Armeni, ‘Participation 
in Environmental Decision-Making: Reflecting on Planning and Community Benefits for Major Wind Farms’ 
(2016) 28 Journal of Environmental Law 415. 
11 See e.g. Rønne (n 3); Paddock and Greenblum (n 3); Aileen McHarg, ‘Community Benefit Through 
Community Ownership of Renewable Generation in Scotland: Power to the People?’ in Lila Barrera-Hernandez 
and others (eds), Sharing the Costs and Benefits of Energy and Resource Activity (Oxford University Press 
2016).  
12 Gillian Bristow, Richard Cowell and Max Munday, ‘Windfalls for Whom? The Evolving Notion of 
“Community” in Community Benefit Provisions from Wind Farms’ (2012) 43 Geoforum 1108; Barry Barton 
and Michael Goldsmith, ‘Community and Sharing’ in Lila Barrera-Hernandez and others (eds), Sharing the 
Costs and Benefits of Energy and Resource Activity: Legal Change and Impact on Communities (Oxford 
University Press 2016); Franziska Mey and Mark Diesendorf, ‘Who Owns an Energy Transition? Strategic 
Action Fields and Community Wind Energy in Denmark’ (2018) 35 Energy Research & Social Science 108; 
Martha Roggenkamp, ‘The Position of Citizens in Energy Production in the Netherlands Is a New Approach 
Emerging?’ in Lila Barrera-Hernandez and others (eds), Sharing the Costs and Benefits of Energy and Resource 
Activity (Oxford University Press 2016). 
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concerning the use of benefit-sharing in the wind energy sector in developing countries and 
in areas inhabited by indigenous people 
Pursuant to a case-study approach this paper set out to bridge this gap, by considering the 
practice of benefit-sharing in renewable energy projects on indigenous peoples’ lands in 
Mexico. The aim is to gauge how the procedural, distributive and recognition justice 
associated with the development of renewable energy generation capacity have been 
addressed, the challenges experienced and the solutions that may be adopted to address these. 
The paper is organised as follows. Part two unpacks the justice questions associated with 
benefit-sharing in the context of renewable energy generation. Part three looks at how these 
questions have been addressed in practice, in the context of renewable energy projects in 
Mexico. Part four provides reflections on what our case study revealed about the use of 
benefit-sharing as a means to obtain increase social acceptance of projects and engender 
energy justice. 
2. Wind Energy and Justice 
Like any other development, renewable energy projects create winners and losers, and 
require that new equilibria be found between societal interests intersecting in a specific site.13 
Pasqualetti notes how, compared with other energy sources, wind energy generation is not 
‘out of sight, out of mind’, which in turn explains why it has generated intense public 
controversy.14 Citizens around the world have found the process of ‘learning to love the 
landscapes of carbon neutrality’ rather difficult,15 not only for loss of amenity reasons, but 
also because of the reawakening of tensions concerning power, recognition and fairness 
associated with the planning and siting of wind farms. 
The feeling that wind projects are ‘someone else’s idea, for someone else’s benefit and for 
someone else’s profit’ is widely reported in empirical studies on renewable energy 
development.16 In other words, the development of renewable energy projects raises 
important procedural and recognition justice questions, and simply disregarding these may 
lead to clashes between developers and those living nearby a project site.17 
As a matter of fact, the benefits and burdens associated with the expansion of wind energy 
generation are usually not evenly spread: benefits of reduced greenhouse gas emissions are 
typically diffuse, reaching the national and even the global level, but the related costs are 
very local.18 Economic benefits are equally often skewed: subsidised profits are enjoyed by 
corporations, while only few economic benefits, such as land rental payments and jobs, 
actually reach local people. This uneven distribution of benefits tends to be even more 
exacerbated in developing countries, as most of the areas with high wind power potential are 
located in remote lands, where indigenous peoples and other marginalised segments of the 
 
13 As argued also in Savaresi (n 5) 18. 
14 See the literature review carried out in M.J. Pasqualetti, ‘Morality, Space, and the Power of Wind-Energy 
Landscapes’ (2001) 90 The Geographical Review 381. 
15 P. Selman, ‘Learning to Love the Landscapes of Carbon-Neutrality’ (2010) 35 Landscape Research 157. 
16 M.J. Pasqualetti, ‘Opposing Wind Energy Landscapes: A Search for Common Cause’ (2011) 101 Annals of 
the Association of American Geographer 907. 
17 G.C. Ledec, K.W. Rapp and R.G. Aiello, ‘Greening the Wind. Environmental and Social Considerations for 
Wind Power Development’ (World Bank 2011); Maria Lee, ‘Knowledge and Landscape in Wind Energy 
Planning’ (2017) 37 Legal Studies 3. 
18 Paddock and Greenblum (n 3), 153; McHarg (n 11), 303. 
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population live. Wind farm developments are often located in low income and remote places 
that do not have access to electricity, or only do so at very high costs.19 In these contexts, 
renewable energy is not produced for local populations, raising significant distributive justice 
questions.20  
In energy and natural resources law, benefit-sharing arrangements have long been used to 
allocate economic as well as socio-cultural advantages produced by the generation of energy 
or the extraction and/or management of resources.21 These arrangements have increasingly 
been used to compensate, reward and involve diverse stakeholders in climate change 
adaptation and mitigation activities, for example in the forest sector.22  
More generally, in environmental governance, benefit-sharing arrangements are moving 
away from practices motivated solely by the aim to ensure social acceptability. They are 
increasingly viewed as means to empower stakeholders, rewarding them for the provision of 
ecosystem services and traditional knowledge and enabling their participation in relevant 
decision-making processes.23 This understanding of benefit-sharing, therefore, entails some 
community agency, in contrast with more passive relations, where communities are mere 
benefits receivers. In this conceptualisation, benefit-sharing is distinct from a top-down flow 
of benefits where stakeholders define the benefits and how they will be distributed. 
Nevertheless, the normative contours of benefit-sharing remain elusive.24  
In the context of renewable energy, developers’ obligations in relation to benefit-sharing 
clearly depend on the applicable legal frameworks, but also on industry practices. So in a 
given context benefit-sharing arrangements may be the result of requirements embedded in 
the law, voluntary guidelines adopted by national and subnational governments, or corporate 
social responsibility practices.25 Benefit-sharing practices in the wind energy sector often 
build upon those developed in the extractive and mining sectors, with local communities 
living in the vicinity of a project receiving various economic and non-economic advantages 
 
19 E.C. Jara, ‘Problemática En Torno a La Construcción De Parques Eólicos En El Istmo De Tehuantepec’ 
(2011) 4 Revista Desarrollo Local Sostenible 12; CCC, ‘Historias y Aprendizajes Sobre El Desarrollo de La 
Energía Eólica En México’ (Centro de Colaboración Cívica); C. Howe, ‘Anthropocenic Ecoauthority: The 
Winds of Oaxaca’ (2014) 87 Anthropol Q 381. 
20 As noted also in Lila Barrera-Hernandez, ‘Indigenous Peoples and Free, Prior, and Informed Consent in Latin 
America’ in Lila Barrera-Hernandez and others (eds), Sharing the Costs and Benefits of Energy and Resource 
Activity (Oxford University Press 2016); McHarg (n 11), 315; Marie Leer Jørgensen, ‘Compensation Schemes 
and Distributive Fairness in Wind Energy Projects’ (European Environmental Law Forum Annual Conference, 
Copenhagen, 2017) <http://law.au.dk/fileadmin/Jura/dokumenter/forskning/EELF/MARIE_LEER__31.08.pdf> 
accessed 26 July 2018. 
21 Carolyn Fisher, ‘International Experience with Benefit-Sharing Instruments for Extractive Resources’ 
(Resources for the Future 2007) <http://www.rff.org/research/publications/international-experience-benefit-
sharing-instruments-extractive-resources> accessed 7 June 2016; Lila Barrera-Hernandez and others (eds), 
‘Introduction’, Sharing the Costs and Benefits of Energy and Resource Activity: Legal Change and Impact on 
Communities (Oxford University Press 2016). 
22 Annalisa Savaresi, ‘The Emergence of Benefit-Sharing Under the Climate Regime. a Preliminary Exploration 
and Research Agenda’ (2014) SSRN Scholarly Paper 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2524335> accessed 8 January 2015; Annalisa Savaresi and 
Kim Bouwer, ‘Equity and Justice in Climate Change Response Measures: Benefit Sharing as a Safeguard’ in T 
Jafry (ed), Routledge Handbook of Climate Justice (Routledge 2018). 
23 Morgera (n 2). 
24 Elisa Morgera, ‘Under the Radar: Fair and Equitable Benefit-Sharing and the Human Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples and Local Communities Related to Natural Resources’ (2019) International Journal of Human Rights. 
25 Savaresi (n 5), 18. 
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from project developers.26 The widespread practice of benefit-packages typically entails 
monetary payments per capacity installed, but developers may also provide other economic 
benefits, such as electricity at discounted prices or grants to support energy efficiency. 
Indeed, the practice of offering shares in projects developed by commercial operators may in 
and of itself be viewed as a means to share economic benefits with local communities.27 
Project developers may furthermore offer local communities other non-monetary benefits, 
such as the development of common facilities for recreation, education, etc. The latter, 
however, raises the question of the extent to which benefit-sharing becomes a means for the 
provision of public services, which should be available to communities regardless of the 
generation of renewable energy.28 In addition, benefit packages provided by developers often 
underplay or fail to take into proper account the spiritual values attached to land, further 
undermining social acceptability of wind energy developments.29 
The practice of so-called ‘community protocols’ –borrowed from other areas from natural 
resource management30–has been increasingly used also in the energy sector as a means to 
empower communities in the context of their relations with developers and public authorities. 
External brokers have played an important role in supporting communities in the design and 
establishment of model protocol templates and, more generally, in engendering community 
capacity to negotiate benefits.31 Some law-makers have also adopted guidelines on 
community benefits. There is, however, a great deal of variation amongst states, and even 
within the same state.32  
One exception to this rather fragmented regulatory picture concerns indigenous peoples, 
whose right to mutually acceptable benefit-sharing arrangements for extractive activities and 
developments taking place on their lands is recognised in international law.33 Indigenous 
peoples enjoy the right to Free Prior Informed Consent (FPIC) for projects carried out on 
their lands and territories.34 This right applies also in relation to renewable energy projects35 
 
26 As explained e.g. in Rønne (n 3) 180; Savaresi (n 5), 18. 
27 As suggested in Rønne (n 3); McHarg (n 11) 301–302. 
28 As suggested for example in Rachel Wynberg and Maria Hauck, ‘Sharing the Benefits from the Coast’ in 
Rachel Wynberg and Maria Hauck (eds), Sharing Benefits from the Coast: Rights, Resources and Livelihoods 
(University of Cape Town Press 2014). 
29 Richard Cowell, Gill Bristow and Max Munday, ‘Acceptance, Acceptability and Environmental Justice: The 
Role of Community Benefits in Wind Energy Development’ (2011) 54 Journal of Environmental Planning and 
Management 539. 
30 See e.g. Harry Jonas, Kabir Bavikatte and Holly Shrumm, ‘Community Protocols and Access and Benefit 
Sharing’ (Natural Justice 2010) <http://naturaljustice.org/wp-
content/uploads/pdf/community_protocols_and_ABS-Asian_biotech_devt_review.pdf>; Louisa Parks, 
‘Challenging Power Asymmetries from the Bottom Up? Community Protocols and the Convention on 
Biological Diversity at the Global/Local Crossroads’ (Social Science Research Network 2016) Geoforum 88 
(2018) 87–95. 
31 As reported e.g. in Bristow, Cowell and Munday (n 12) 1115. 
32 This matter is further discussed in Savaresi (n 5), 21. 
33 International Labour Organization’s (ILO) Convention no. 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 
Independent Countries 1989, 28 ILM 1382. See also UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms of indigenous peoples, Report UN Doc. E/CN.4/2003/90, 66; and 2012 Expert 
Mechanism: Follow-up report on indigenous peoples and the right to participate in decision-making with a focus 
on extractive industries UN Doc. A/HRC/21/52 and A/HRC/21/55, 39.  
34 UNDRIP, Article 19 and the review of practice in International Law Association, The Hague Conference 
Report, Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2010), 51; and in UN-REDD Programme, ‘Legal Companion to the UN-
REDD Programme Guidelines on FPIC’ (UN-REDD 2012) 
<http://www.unredd.net/index.php?view=document&alias=8792-legal-companion-to-the-un-redd-programme-
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In some areas on environmental policy, the right to FPIC has been extended to local 
communities.36 This extension is, however, far from being established practice in the energy 
context, where local communities appear to enjoy a lesser degree of protection, when 
compared with indigenous peoples. Even in relation to indigenous peoples, benefit-sharing 
arrangements are often problematic. Renewable energy projects may become more locally 
divisive and controversial if benefits are not equitably shared among local people. There are, 
in other words, problematic distributive, procedural and recognition justice questions 
regarding how a given community is defined, who speaks for it, who participates in the 
negotiation process and how and to what extent should the community exert a veto power.37  
In spite of their widespread uptake, the literature reports how benefit-sharing arrangements 
still tend to be perceived as a bribe to secure project approval and/or minimise public 
resistance.38 And while some authors point to the advantages of greater benefits 
institutionalisation associated with shared project ownership39 and of spelling out benefits in 
more positive terms,40 increasing opposition to the development of wind farms in countries 
that have adopted an institutionalised approach to benefit-sharing does not necessarily 
corroborate this proposition, further demonstrating that distributive justice considerations 
remain a concern.41  
In sum, the question of how to guarantee a fair distribution of benefits and burdens associated 
with the expansion of renewable energy generation capacity is still very much an open one.42 
These questions are particularly crucial in relation to vulnerable groups, such as indigenous 
peoples. In the following section, data from the growing wind energy sector in the Isthmus of 
Tehuantepec is used to gauge how benefit-sharing arrangements have addressed the core 
distributive, procedural and recognition justice questions expounded above. 
 
guidelines-on-fpic-8792&category_slug=legal-companion-to-fpic-guidelines-
2655&layout=default&option=com_docman&Itemid=134> accessed 22 March 2017. 
35 See e.g. Lila Barrera-Hernandez, ‘Indigenous Peoples and Free, Prior, and Informed Consent in Latin 
America’ in Lila Barrera-Hernandez and others (eds), Sharing the Costs and Benefits of Energy and Resource 
Activity (Oxford University Press 2016). 
36 See e.g. Nagoya Protocol, Articles 6.2 and 7. See the analysis in Annalisa Savaresi, ‘The International Human 
Rights Law Implications of the Nagoya Protocol’ in Elisa Morgera, Matthias Buck and Elsa Tsioumani (eds), 
The 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing in Perspective (Martinus Nijhoff 2013),75-78 and 
Framework Principles on Human Rights and the Environment, UN Doc (A/HRC/37/59), Principle 15. 
37 Mhairi Aitken, Seonaidh McDonald and Peter Strachan, ‘Locating “Power” in Wind Power Planning 
Processes: The (Not so) Influential Role of Local Objectors’ (2008) 51 Journal of Environmental Planning and 
Management 777; Savaresi (n 5), 8. 
38 See e.g. Aitken, McDonald and Strachan (n 37); Noel Cass, Gordon Walker and Patrick Devine-Wright, 
‘Good Neighbours, Public Relations and Bribes: The Politics and Perceptions of Community Benefit Provision 
in Renewable Energy Development in the UK’ (2010) 12 Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning 255; 
Benjamin JA Walker, Duncan Russel and Tim Kurz, ‘Community Benefits or Community Bribes? An 
Experimental Analysis of Strategies for Managing Community Perceptions of Bribery Surrounding the Siting of 
Renewable Energy Projects’ (2017) 49 Environment and Behavior 59.  
39 See e.g. Walker, Russel and Kurz (n 165) 78. 
40 See e.g. David Rudolph, Claire Haggett and Mhairi Aitken, ‘Community Benefits from Offshore Renewables: 
The Relationship between Different Understandings of Impact, Community, and Benefit’ (2017) 36 
Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space 91,102. 
41 See Mey and Diesendorf (n 12). 
42 As acknowledged also in Bill Slee and Jelte Harnmeijer, ‘Community Renewables: Balancing Optimism with 
Reality’ in Wood, Geoffrey and Keith Baker (eds), A Critical Review of Scottish Renewable and Low Carbon 
Energy Policy (Palgrave Macmillan 2017); McHarg (n 11), 315; Savaresi (n 5), 11-12. 
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3. Benefit-sharing in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec: Theory and Reality 
Mexico has great wind energy generation potential, and the Isthmus of Tehuantepec region 
has been identified as one of the best areas to establish wind farms,43 with a potential to 
supply up to 7% of the country’s energy needs.44 The Isthmus of Tehuantepec is located in 
Oaxaca, one of the three states with the highest percentage of indigenous population in 
Mexico.45 The Mixe, Zoque, Popoluca, Chontal, Huave, Náhuatl and Zapoteco have 
populated this region since pre-Hispanic times. Indigenous peoples in Mexico are generally 
characterized as groups who deserve special attention, due to the profound social 
disadvantage they suffer in relation to the rest of the Mexican population. The National 
Population Council notes how 84% of the municipalities in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec face 
a moderate, high and very high grade of marginalisation.46 According to the National 
Institute of Statistics and Geography, this marginalisation is related to deficiencies in basic 
education and housing, residence in small, dispersed and isolated localities, and low 
monetary income.47  
Mexico as a whole has 43.4 coefficient in the GINI 2016 Index48 and income inequality 
greatly affects the Isthmus, as a result of the legacy of colonisation and discrimination against 
indigenous and non-whites.49 All these factors intersect in a region where social conflict has 
been a main feature for centuries.50 Following a major energy reform in 2008 that facilitated 
international private capital investments,51 large international utility companies – such as 
Acciona, Iberdrola, Gas Natural Fenosa, EDF, Enel, and Mexico’s CFE– started to operate in 
the Isthmus, producing up to 3,527MW in 2016.52 Nevertheless, negotiations with indigenous 
landowners have taken place without a clear legislative framework, resulting in political 
conflict, economic loss, and social disruption within a region historically already marked by 
poverty and ethnic struggles. While on paper the establishment of wind farms was a good 
opportunity for the region, lack of social acceptance and negative social impacts are putting 
further investments at risk. 
This state of affairs has already attracted some scholarly interest, and two major studies have 
examined the divergent stakeholder perceptions on the existing conflict.53 These studies have 
 
43 S Nahmad, A Nahón and R Langlé, ‘La Visión De Los Actores Sociales Frente a Los Proyectos Eólicos Del 
Istmo De Tehuantepec’ (2014). 
44 R Henestroza Orozco, ‘Centrales Eólicas En El Istmo De Tehuantepec; Su Impacto Ambiental Y 
Socioeconómico. Elementos’ (Universidad de Puebla 2008). 
45 INEGI, ‘Hablantes De Lengua Indígena En México’ (INEGI 2015) 
<http://cuentame.inegi.org.mx/poblacion/lindigena.aspx?tema=P>. 
46 INMUJERES, ‘Las Mujeres Indígenas De México: Su Contexto Socioeconómico, Demográfico Y De Salud’ 
(Instituto Nacional de las Mujeres 2006) 46. 
47 INEGI (n 45). 
48 Data extrapolated from: World Bank2016 GINI index 
<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?end=2016&locations=MX&start=2004>  
49 F. Comim, ‘The Post-2015 Global Development Agenda: A Latin American Perspective’ (2015) 27 Journal of 
International Development 330. 
50 Nahmad, Nahón and Langlé (n 43). 
51 International Renewable Energy Agency, ‘Renewable Energy Prospects: Mexico’ (IRENA 2015) 
<http://www.irena.org/documentdownloads/publications/irena_remap_mexico_summary _2015.pdf>. 
52 GWEC, ‘Global Wind Report 2016’ (2016) <https://gwec.net/publications/global-wind-report-2/global-wind-
report-2016/> accessed 14 February 2019. 
53 Nahmad, Nahón and Langlé (n 43); CCC (n 19). 
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suggested that failure to distribute benefits within local communities has been one of the 
main causes for opposition.  
The Isthmus of Tehuantepec is therefore a good place to conduct an inquiry to analyse the 
complex justice questions associated with the energy transition and the expansion of 
renewable energy generation capacity, in the context of the poor and marginalized areas 
where indigenous populations live. The remainder of this paper looks more closely at this 
matter, providing a state of the art of benefit-sharing in Mexico’s wind energy industry, and 
analysing the relationship between indigenous peoples’ FPIC and benefit-sharing in the 
Isthmus of Tehuantepec.  
The data informing the present study was collected through 89 semi-structured interviews, 
conducted with stakeholders in three communities of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec region. The 
stakeholders included people that own land where the wind farms are established, farmers, 
agrarian authorities, and people affected by wind farms that do not receive benefits. These 
stakeholders were asked to provide their perspectives on legislative instruments for benefit-
sharing and public engagement/governance decisions in Mexico’s wind energy sector. 
Participants were selected to provide a balanced representation of age, gender, ethnicity, and 
socioeconomic status. In addition, a survey questionnaire was completed by 557 participants 
across three communities where wind farms have already been installed and have further 
developments planned. 
Two expert focus groups were furthermore held in connection with the ‘X Regional Forum 
on the Transformation of Socio-environmental Conflicts in Latin America’, which took place 
in Mexico City on 28 and 29 of November 2018. The forum’s participants included 
representatives of energy and mining companies, members of local, state, and national 
governments, representatives of NGOs and academia from Latin American countries. The 
focus groups explored the main obstacles to benefit-sharing between developers, 
governments and communities, the practices to institutionalise benefit-sharing arrangements 
at the regional level, and the extent to which accountability and dialogue may increase the 
perceived ‘fairness’ of benefit sharing schemes.  
3.1 The Practice of Benefit-sharing in Mexico’s Wind Energy Sector 
Mexico’s legal framework on renewable energy does not make any reference to benefit-
sharing arrangements. Nevertheless, the Constitution affirms that all people shall enjoy the 
human rights recognized in it, as well as in the international treaties to which the Mexican 
State is a party.54 As mentioned above, indigenous peoples’ right to mutually acceptable 
benefit-sharing for extractive activities and developments taking place on their lands is 
recognised in international law.55 Mexico is a party to ILO Convention 169 on Indigenous 
and Tribal Peoples, which establishes that states must consult the peoples concerned, through 
appropriate procedures and in particular through its representative institutions, whenever 
legislative or administrative measures are contemplated that may affect them directly.56 The 
Convention stipulates that indigenous peoples’ rights to the natural resources existing on their 
lands should be protected.57 These rights include the right of indigenous peoples to 
 
54 Constitution of Mexico, Article 1. 
55 See n 33 above and corresponding text. 
56 ILO Convention 169, Article 6, section 1, subparagraph a. 
57 Ibid. Article 15.1. 
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participate in the use, administration and conservation of said resources. The Mexican 
Constitution guarantees indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination,58 but also affirms 
that the Government has the right to regulate the exploitation of natural resources with the 
aim of distributing wealth equitably.59 The Electric Industry and Hydrocarbons Law obliges 
interested parties to carry out negotiations and agreements in a transparent form, identifying 
both the positive and negative impacts of projects.60 
In 2017 the Mexican Ministry of Energy and the Inter-American Development Bank prepared 
an Action Protocol on Shared Social Benefits (PROBESCO).61 This non-binding instrument 
is meant to be used as a reference for stakeholders to understand what benefit-sharing is and 
when does it apply and by whom. The protocol defines benefit-sharing as arrangements 
provided by developers to contribute to the development of local communities in the short, 
medium and long term.62 It clarifies that shared-benefits are different from measures to 
prevent, mitigate or compensate negative impacts caused by developments, rents payed for 
surface use, taxes, and social infrastructure that was built for the use of the project itself. The 
document suggests that 1% of the initial investment to be given as benefits for the community 
during the stage of preparation and construction, and 1% of the annual income to be provided 
during the stage of production. This fund is to be managed by a legal entity appointed by 
local communities.  
The guidance included in PROBESCO is merely voluntary, and wind energy developers in 
the Isthmus of Tehuantepec are not formally obliged to provide community benefits. The lack 
of institutionalisation of benefit-sharing has led to the development of corporate practices that 
are implemented on an ad hoc basis and at the developer’s discretion. As a consequence, 
developers consider their contributions as altruistic and not as the right of indigenous 
communities to decide and profit from their land and resources. And, even though benefit-
sharing should happen irrespective of communities’ consent, developers often only offer 
benefits in exchange for acceptance of new windfarms or enlargement of existing ones. 
Landowners with a contrato de apartado – a contract to set-aside their land in promise of a 
new development – reportedly promote benefit-sharing packages in an effort to engender 
support for new wind energy projects.63 
During our interviews, a group of local tradeswomen described this practice as ‘buying our 
will’ and ‘profiting from our situation of poverty’64, thus seemingly corroborating the 
suggestion that benefit sharing schemes are often considered as bribes by recipients.65 
Indigenous peoples interviewees also believed that developers provide benefit packages 
because they are required to do so by law, but could not identify the source of that obligation.  
According to PROBESCO, benefit-sharing arrangements should be based in information 
provided by studies of social feasibility, such as the Social Impact Assessment and the 
preliminary proposals for the project’s Social Management Plan. PROBESCO also specifies 
 
58 Constitution of Mexico, Article 2. 
59 Ibid, Article 27. 
60 Electric Industry and Hydrocarbons Law, Article 74. 
61 Bazbaz Kuri, S. (2017) Protocolo de Actuación sobre Beneficio Sociales Compartidos de Proyectos 
Energéticos (PROBESCO). Unpublished report of Ministry of Energy Mexico 
62 Ibid. 
63 Interview transcripts on file with the author. 
64 Interview transcripts on file with the author. 
65 Walker, Russel and Kurz (n 38); Cass, Walker and Devine-Wright (n 38). 
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that benefit-sharing arrangements should not prejudge indigenous peoples’ free consent to the 
development of an energy project, and should not be set as a precondition for acceptability.  
Indigenous peoples’ right to FPIC is part and parcel of their right to self-determination and to 
benefit from the development of their land.66 It is therefore potentially a powerful tool to 
operationalise indigenous rights in the context of renewable energy projects.67 Benefit-
sharing and FPIC interact in main two ways. As Morgera notes, on the one hand, benefit-
sharing may serve as a condition for conceding FPIC, resulting in culturally appropriate and 
effective consultations. On the other hand, it may represent the result of a FPIC process, 
providing a tangible expression of the agreement based on what local communities 
understand and prefer.68  
Mexico’s Electricity Industry Law has established a procedure to obtain FPIC for 
developments on indigenous peoples’ lands.69 The Ministry of Energy has been entrusted to 
carry out the necessary consultations and preparatory activities, in coordination with the 
Ministry of the Interior and the relevant authorities.70 Pursuant to this mandate, the Ministry 
of Energy has developed a proposal for national legislation on benefit-sharing within 
indigenous lands. At the time of writing, however, no legislation has been adopted. In the 
meantime, the practice of project development has revealed a series of challenges, associated 
with defining the scope communities to be involved in FPIC and benefit-sharing 
arrangements; as well as with defining the roles of government and of developers. The next 
sections of the paper explore each of these challenges in turn.  
3.2 Defining Communities  
As noted above, defining who is the community to be consulted in the context of renewable 
energy projects is often a complex endeavour, which raises a host of procedural and 
recognition justice questions.71 The delimitation of the scope of community may in and of 
itself result in divisions within a community and group conflict.72 The composition and 
character of a community are political and thus vulnerable to resolutions that may not always 
be just and democratic. It is therefore important to acknowledge that, also in relation to 
renewable energy projects, there is not a single local community, but several interested local 
groups within a community, and even within different groups, stakes and perspectives may 
differ.73 
The literature has depicted communities in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec as romantic entities, 
as opposed to larger, more diverse, and sometimes conflicting forms of association, drawing 
 
66 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (13 September 2007) A/RES/61/295 
[‘UNDRIP’], articles 10, 11, 19, 23, 28, 29, 30 and 32. 
67 Barrera-Hernandez (n 20). 
68 Morgera (n 2). 
69 Electricity Industry Law 2014.  
70 Ibid. Article 119 
71 Aitken, McDonald and Strachan (n 37); Barton and Goldsmith (n 12); and Savaresi (n 5), 20. 
72 Barton and Goldsmith (n 12). 
73 Aitken, McDonald and Strachan (n 37); Bregje van Veelen and Claire Haggett, ‘Uncommon Ground: The 
Role of Different Place Attachments in Explaining Community Renewable Energy Projects’ [2016] Sociologia 
Ruralis <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/soru.12128/abstract> accessed 6 March 2017; Bregje van 
Veelen, ‘Negotiating Energy Democracy in Practice: Governance Processes in Community Energy Projects’ 
(2018) 27 Environmental Politics 644. 
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on ideals of pre-industrial societies.74 This depiction, however, is problematic, since there is 
not a single local community, but several groups with different interests and perspectives. As 
elsewhere, therefore, community ‘is a contested, multi-dimensional concept, based on 
identity, practice, objectives and the places to which these apply’.75 
The interplay between the notion of community and that indigenous peoples is also 
complicated. These terms are often used together and even interchangeably to support ideas 
of assertion, self-determination and resistance.76 Nevertheless, to assume that a community 
will be collective, democratic and functional just because it is indigenous is misleading.77 
Within an indigenous community exist power imbalances that enable certain stakeholders to 
participate in decisions and not others, and hierarchies of gender, race and class also apply.  
In Mexico there is no official definition of who qualifies as indigenous. This aligns with 
international law practice, whereby representatives from indigenous organisations have 
rejected the adoption of a formal definition,78 and preferred to use self-identification in its 
stead.79 Self-identification is therefore the most important element to be considered, in 
combination with other elements such as attachment to territory and language.80  
People in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec are reluctant to describe themselves as indigenous 
people. In the Isthmus, citizens labelled as ‘indigenous’ have been regarded as a second-class 
citizen, as explained by a community cultural officer in one of our interviews: ‘many people 
(..) do not assume themselves as indigenous. This is because they believe that having an 
education takes away your indigenous armour, as if because of being indigenous you could 
not have the possibility of having an appropriate education…’. Nevertheless, FPIC process 
associated with developments have enabled local populations to partake in processes that 
they would not be able to do otherwise, resulting in an increase of indigenous self-
identification in the region.  
3.3 Defining Benefits 
Interviewees in the Isthmus noted that, though wind farms had provided communities with 
some benefits, these were partly co-opted by landowners, who claimed that they were the 
community affected by wind farms. And, even if benefit-packages had reached the local 
government, these were distributed at the discretion of the authorities, who used these mainly 
 
74 A Dunlap, ‘'The Town Is Surrounded’: From Climate Concerns to Life Under Wind Turbines in La Ventosa, 
Mexico’ (2017) 10 Human Geography 16; Howe (n 19); Cymene Howe, Dominic Boyer and Edith Barrera, 
‘Los Márgenes Del Estado Al Viento: Autonomía Y Desarrollo De Energías Renovables En El Sur De México’ 
(2015) 20 The Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Anthropology 285; Jara (n 19). 
75 Katrina Myrvang Brown, ‘Understanding the Materialities and Moralities of Property: Reworking Collective 
Claims to Land’ (2007) 32 Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 507. 
76 Barton and Goldsmith (n 12) 37. 
77 Barrera-Hernandez (n 20) 85. 
78 See UN Commission on Human Rights, “Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples. Report of the Working 
Group on Indigenous Populations on its Fourteenth Session,” (16 August 1996) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/21. 
79 International Law Association, The Hague Conference Report, Rights of Indigenous Peoples, (2010) 6. 
80 Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous Peoples, 
‘Report on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous Peoples: The Human 
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(2008) A/HRC/9/9. 
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for political purposes. Benefit-sharing therefore has been favourable to certain groups, parties 
or interests, but not to others. 
In wind farm developments, property rights are a key determinant to the distribution of costs 
and benefits. Wind energy developments grant landowners power over decision making on 
how to manage and invest on their land, leaving neighbouring, landless communities little 
opportunity to influence decision-making.81 As a result, there is resentment over the ability of 
landowners to profit and make decisions about the development of wind farms, in ways that 
other local inhabitants cannot. In the Isthmus, landowners often do not inhabit the land 
neighbouring a wind farm, and thus make decisions without taking into consideration the 
concerns of local residents living in the immediate vicinity of the wind turbines. Moreover, 
land tenure is still in dispute in many sites, and local stakeholders have demanded that these 
disputes be solved before agreeing the lease of the land. 
Finally, even when defined by the community, benefit-sharing arrangements are not always 
sustainable. Wind energy developers benefit-sharing packages range from cash payments to 
landowners and/or municipalities, or in-kind payments, such as seeds or farm tools and 
equipment, to social infrastructure such as roads, sewage system, and additions to hospitals 
and schools. Cash payments entail a series of decision-making processes that often result in 
conflicting views on how these funds should be used. In kind benefits can also be 
problematic. In kind benefits that involve services usually given by the government such as 
roads, schools and hospitals have meant that developers have slowly undertaken state 
responsibilities, as suggested in the literature.82 This has special implications in the Isthmus 
of Tehuantepec, where 88% of the participants in our survey expressed the belief that the 
government is responsible for their well-being. In this context, companies may become 
responsible of providing basic services to the population, compromising their long-term 
social security.  
3.4 The Role of Government 
Benefit-sharing within communities often relies on local authorities collecting and 
distributing resources.83 Nevertheless, the literature suggests that sudden revenues from 
natural resources can be a trap for governments with weak institutions, putting additional 
stress on democracy, rule of law, integrity in public services, and planning.84  
In the early stages of the development of the wind energy industry in the Isthmus of 
Tehuantepec, the local and state government could be labelled as ‘absent’. They would not 
interfere in landowners-developer meetings or in the arrangements that they made regarding 
rent payments and benefits. Therefore, they did not have a formal role and did not intervene, 
even in cases where one of the parties did not respect the contracts. There were numerous 
legal voids in these contracts, and often local leadership, such as Comisariados Ejidales 
(leaders of an ejido piece of land farmed communally under a system supported by the state) 
was transformed into a commodity. Rather crucially, there was, and there still is a lack of 
responsibility definition in these contracts.  
 
81 As noted also in McHarg (n 11), 298. 
82 See note 28 above, 
83 Barton and Goldsmith (n 12). 
84 Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It (1 
edition, Oxford University Press, USA 2008) 49. 
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As mentioned above, under Mexican law, FPIC requires local governments to establish the 
procedure to be followed and lead in its implementation. This arrangements has exposed the 
fragility of local institutions, lack of support from other levels of government in terms of 
resources and capacity, and a lack of trust from local communities.85 Therefore, although 
delegating the coordination of the FPIC to the government may have seen like an obvious 
solution, this has proven problematic. The Ministry of Energy is in charge of the FPIC 
process, but also of meeting the targets for national renewable energy production. The 
ministry therefore clearly has a vested interest in having projects approved, and been placed 
in a conflict of interest position. Moreover, the ministry has assigned minimal resources to 
FPIC, with only three members of staff in charge of revising projects’ Social Impact 
Assessments and coordinating consultations nationally.  
Given this state of affairs, it is unsurprising that 77% of our interviewees indicated that they 
did not trust the local authority and expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that resources were 
being used for political and/or personal purposes. This situation of distrust is hardened in a 
region, where local governments have systematically neglected the plight of indigenous 
peoples. As a result, communities often take advantage of the forum provided by FPIC 
processes to air grievances concerning colonial legacy and earlier unsuccessful development 
projects in the region.  
3.5 The Role of Developers 
For developers, the lack of clear governmental guidance on benefit-sharing and FPIC has 
been a source of uncertainty. While the provision of community benefits remains voluntary in 
Mexico, in practice developers use the provision of benefits for securing acceptance and 
protect operations. However, since there is no legal framework that controls and records these 
benefits, developers feel that they are often used as bribes, leading to an upward spiral of 
demands, whereby communities request benefit increases, which at times culminates in what 
one interviewee described as ‘extortion’ from certain groups within a community. Weak 
institutions and regulatory frameworks have left developers disincentivised from engaging in 
further deliberative processes and investments.86 
The timeframe for FPIC has been especially problematic. The Ministry of Energy has 
suggested that the process for FPIC may take as little as three days to complete. Yet, in 
reality, agreeing the first FPIC protocol for a wind farm took six months, and undertaking the 
related consultation process took eight months87. This example clearly shows the need to 
manage investors’ expectations, and to properly factor consultations into projects plans.  
Developers largely view more formalised and institutionalised benefit-sharing and FPIC 
processes as a means to provide legal security for their investments. Communities would not 
be able to escalate their demands, and give developers greater confidence in what to expect 
and to properly budget for the related financial resources in early planning stages.  
 
 
85 Interview transcripts on file with the author. 
86 Interview transcripts on file with the author. 
87 Interview transcripts on file with the author. 
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3.6 A Need for Greater Institutionalisation? 
Developers’ suggestions concerning the institutionalisation of FPIC and benefit-sharing align 
with those made in the literature.88 Reform proposals of FPIC procedures have been put 
forward by federal deputies to specifically cover elements of international and regional 
human rights treaties, as well as of the Constitution.89 These reforms are presently stalled, 
due to the start of a new legislature. In the meantime, at the ‘X Regional Forum on the 
Transformation of Socio-environmental Conflicts in Latin America’, held in Mexico City in 
November 2018, other stakeholders in the region expressed less confidence in greater 
institutionalisation.  
NGOs and representatives of indigenous communities raised the concern that FPIC could 
become a tick boxing exercise that undermines the self-determination of indigenous people.90 
The forum concluded that the FPIC procedures implemented so far have not respected human 
rights. Quite to the contrary, they have become means for the rubberstamping of investment 
projects already agreed between developers and governments. Moreover, these processes 
have been characterised by community division, criminalisation of opponents of 
developments, and the omission of measures that may allow women to participate. The 
participants also lamented that civil servants in charge of FPIC processes constantly changed. 
The forum concluded that so these procedures have been marked by political pressure and 
have resorted to manipulation to favour third party interests over indigenous lands. 
Enshrining FPIC in the law has, for the time being, not delivered favourable for the exercise 
of indigenous peoples’ rights.91 
Indigenous peoples and human rights organisations have expressed a preference for the 
development of other mechanisms, such as community protocols. As mentioned above, 
community protocols may be used as means of empowerment to increase community 
capacity to negotiate benefits with developers and public authorities92 given that they are 
recognised in national law. These suggestions are motivated on the ground that, even if FPIC 
institutionalisation is done properly, this would not guarantee that national governments 
would duly follow the related procedures. The supporters for alternatives further argue that, 
even if the ultimate rationale for more institutionalisation is to give legal security to 
communities, historically lack of tenure security has disproportionately affected indigenous 
lands –an issue that is still ongoing and has to be resolved. In this connection, wind farm 
developments have not so much caused, but simply reignited historical land disputes in the 
region.  
In light of all the above, the forum participants called for the self-determination of indigenous 
peoples and their right to define their development priorities to be placed at the centre of the 
 
88 See above note 40 and corresponding text. 
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debate concerning greater institutionalisation of both FPIC and benefit-sharing in Mexico.93 
They emphasised the need for genuine community engagement prior to the planning and 
development of wind farms, moving from a ‘decide-announce-defend’ approach, towards a 
‘consult-consider-modify’ approach.94 
4. Conclusions 
This paper has taken stock of the practice of FPIC and benefit-sharing in the specific context 
of wind farm developments in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, analysing original, unpublished 
empirical data in the light of the literature on benefit-sharing and energy justice. It shows 
how benefit-sharing and FPIC have become a standard feature of wind energy developments 
in indigenous peoples’ lands in the region. While the establishment of these processes is in 
and of itself a welcome development, how people participate and engage does matter. The 
empirical evidence in this paper clearly shows that much needs to be done in order to deliver 
genuine open, democratic decision-making over wind farm developments in the Isthmus, as 
well as benefits to its people.  
The data analysed in this paper has shown that lack of institutionalised guidance on the 
distribution of benefits has led to corporate policies that are developed and implemented on 
an ad hoc basis. Wind energy developments in indigenous lands have been marked by power 
asymmetries, with undesirable or even harmful results for those living nearby. These 
outcomes were exacerbated by local governments’ inability and/or unwillingness to act as 
good faith brokers between developers and communities.  
It seems therefore fair to conclude that the complex distributive, recognition and procedural 
justice considerations affecting the development of wind farms the Isthmus of Tehuantepec 
have not been adequately resolved. Defining the scope of communities to be involved in 
FPIC and benefit-sharing processes has been challenging, and the solution of the related 
recognition justice questions has remained elusive. Our findings thus corroborate suggestions 
in the literature that the notions of community, as well as indigenous peoples, do not 
necessarily correspond to homogenous groups that are supported by collective intents.  
Institutionalised procedures for FPIC and benefit-sharing may give communities and 
developers greater certainty about their rights and responsibilities, and what to expect from a 
wind farm. Nevertheless, institutionalisation is not an end in itself, and rather needs to be 
coupled with greater transparency and accountability to increase trust between the parties 
involved. Procedural justice consideration, in other words, need to be better addressed, 
including by designing consultation processes endowed with adequate time and resources, 
which make engagement desirable and accessible.  
Finally, distributive justice has also remained elusive. Agreed benefit-sharing arrangements 
have only delivered favourable results for certain groups, at the expense of others. The 
projects have not delivered the expected outcomes, and both developers and communities 
were left feeling exploited and dissatisfied. This in turn has raised questions on the role of 
governmental authorities in overseeing that equitable outcomes are delivered, and whether 
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indeed these can be achieved through bilateral negotiations between large corporations and 
indigenous communities, given the inequalities of power and resources between them.95 
In sum, the data analysed in this paper confirms that, while benefit-sharing arrangements are 
commonly expected to help creating the conditions for the successful establishment of wind 
farms, they are not enough in themselves. Instead, an adequate power balance in developer-
government-community relations needs to be achieved. This is the holy grail of all 
development activities, and renewable energy projects are not different from any other.96 
Instead renewable energy projects rather tell a familiar tale, whereby public involvement and 
even benefit-sharing arrangements may simply be used a token to obtain acceptance of new 
developments, which however only sow the seeds of conflict in the long run. Arguably, only 
by going beyond narrow, tokenistic conversations would it be possible to deliver genuine 
solutions to the unequal distribution of burdens and benefits in the energy transition, and the 
related complex social justice questions.97 This is easier said than done, and the quest for the 
tools for making this happen in practice continues, well beyond the Isthmus of Tehuantepec. 
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